In this paper I argue that selective abortion for disability often involves inadequate counselling on the part of reproductive medicine professionals who advise prospective parents. I claim that prenatal disability clinicians often fail in intellectual duty—they are culpably ignorant about intellectual disability. First, I explain why a standard motivation for selective abortion is flawed. Second, I summarize recent research on parent experience with prenatal professionals. Third, I outline the notions of epistemic excellence and deficiency. Fourth, I defend culpable ignorance as (...) the best explanation of inadequate disability counselling. Fifth, I rebut alternative explanations. My focus is pregnancies diagnosed with mild or moderate intellectual disability. (shrink)

First published over thirty years ago, "Classic Philosophical Questions" has presented decades of students with the most compelling classic and contemporary readings on the most enduring and abiding questions in philosophy. The anthology, topically arranged, uses debate and argument as vehicles to teach students the fundamentals of philosophy while also demonstrating that philosophy is a discourse spanning centuries. "James A. Gould" and "Robert J. Mulvaney" continue to provide students with interesting, intriguing essays from major philosophers in a distinctive presentation, (...) often involving a pro/con format, to ensure that both the apparent and subtle points of argument are both meaningful and clear. Features of this new edition: Sections on epistemology and metaphysics introduced earlier in this edition New readings from Martha Nussbaum and Martin Luther King, Jr. Concise, student-friendly introductions to each philosopher and reading Helpful study and reflection questions focus students' reading and improve comprehension. (shrink)

Research shows that a high majority of parents receiving prenatal diagnosis of intellectual disability terminate pregnancy. They have reasons for rejecting a child with intellectual disabilities—these reasons are, most commonly, beliefs about quality of life for it or them. Without a negative evaluation of intellectual disability, their choice makes no sense. Disability-based abortion has been critiqued through virtue ethics for being inconsistent with admirable moral character. Parental selectivity conflicts with the virtue of acceptingness and exhibits the vice of wilfulness. In (...) this paper I claim that, beyond failures of moral virtue, disability abortion often involves failures of epistemic virtue on the part of parents. I argue two things: parents believe something false, or at least contested, about life with intellectual disability—and they do so because they are not epistemically conscientious. I first explain why a central motivation for disability abortion—that it prevents harm to the child—is mistaken. I next give a brief account of intellectual virtue and culpable ignorance. I then indicate why many parents fail to be intellectually virtuous when choosing to terminate pregnancy. I focus on elimination of intellectual disability and have little to say about physical and sensory impairments. (shrink)

These original essays by seven leading contemporary political philosophers spanning the political spectrum explore the possibility of achieving agreement in political theory. Each philosopher defends in a principal essay his or her own view of social justice and also comments on two or more of the other essays. The result is a lively exchange that leaves the reader to judge to what degree the contributors achieve agreement or reconciliation.

The Covid-19 pandemic provides a real-world context for evaluating the fairness of disability-based rationing of scarce medical resources. I discuss three situations clinicians may face: rationing based on disability itself; rationing based on inevitable disability-related comorbidities; and rationing based on preventable disability-related comorbidities. I defend three conclusions. First, in a just distribution, extraneous factors do not influence a person’s share. This rules out rationing based on disability alone, where no comorbidities decrease a person’s capacity to benefit from treatment. Second, in (...) a just distribution, undeserved luck does not influence a person’s share. This rules out rationing for biologically caused comorbidities that decrease capacity to benefit. Third, in a just distribution, social injustice does not influence a person’s share. This rules out rationing for socially caused comorbidities that decrease capacity to benefit. (shrink)

While there are many significant ethical questions which can deliver the lessons of an introductory ethics course (e.g. global warming, world hunger, genetic engineering), students do not face these moral difficulties directly in their lives. The author argues that commonly-faced ethical questions are more effective for rendering the content of introductory ethics immediately relevant to students. This paper presents a general outline of an introductory ethics course structured around the theme of drunk driving. Not only is drunk driving something that (...) college students are confronted with consistently, but the topic lends itself to discussions of moral subjectivism and moral skepticism, various moral theories’ framings of the problem, the assignment of culpability and conditions which mitigate it, secondary responsibility, intoxication and agency, punishment, deterrents, contrition, and forgiveness. The author details each of these discussions and concludes by considering further benefits of teaching a course built around this theme. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the benefits of discussing moral issues concerning the domestic realm in an introductory ethics course, especially moral issues surrounding divorce. The subject of divorce in introductory courses can illustrate to students significant dimensions in ethical theory and also serves as a useful pedagogical tool to bridge the gap between abstract ethical theories and students’ daily lives. Divorce is a common experience that allows students to personally engage with ethical questions that often have often immediate relevance to (...) their personal morality. (shrink)

A key question in disability studies, philosophy, and bioethics concerns the relationship between disability and well-being. The mere difference view, endorsed by Elizabeth Barnes, claims that physical and sensory disabilities by themselves do not make a person worse off overall—any negative impacts on welfare are due to social injustice. This article argues that Barnes’s Value Neutral Model does not extend to intellectual disability. Intellectual disability is (1) intrinsically bad—by itself it makes a person worse off, apart from a non-accommodating environment; (...) (2) universally bad—it lowers quality of life for every intellectually disabled person; and (3) globally bad—it reduces a person’s overall well-being. While people with intellectual disabilities are functionally disadvantaged, this does not imply that they are morally inferior—lower quality of life does not mean lesser moral status. No clinical implications concerning disability-based selective abortion, denial of life-saving treatment, or rationing of scarce resources follow from the claim that intellectual disability is bad difference. (shrink)

The mere difference view, endorsed by some philosophers and Christian scholars, claims that disability by itself does not make a person worse off on balance—any negative impacts on overall welfare are due to social injustice. This article defends the bad difference view—some disability is bad not simply because of social arrangements but because of biological deficits that, by themselves, make a person worse off. It argues that the mere difference view contradicts core doctrines of Christian faith. The analysis focuses on (...) intellectual rather than physical or sensory disabilities. (shrink)

In this paper I defend three points: (1) God loves and desires the salvation of every human person, (2) saving grace is available outside of the Christian church to those who do not hear the gospel but pursue moral goodness and (3) most, if not all, human persons will be saved. I argue that soteriological restrictivism is logically incoherent since its two ideas—every person is loved by God and only those who hear and believe the Christian gospel can be saved—cannot (...) both be true. Throughout I integrate insights from Karl Rahner’snotion of “anonymous Christianity.”. (shrink)

This paper reports on a pedagogical strategy used when discussing consensual and non-consensual sex in college ethics courses. The paper outlines a general teaching technique designed to elicit what students already think about a particular issue and then applies this general technique to the seven specific cases involving unwanted sex. Classroom results on these cases are described, reporting that students tend to adopt two different definitions of what it means for sex to be “consensual”. A commentary on these cases is (...) provided that can be used to encourage students to think through the cases critically, and the author provides a brief commentary on how these cases relate to the notion of autonomy. (shrink)

This paper reports on a pedagogical strategy used when discussing consensual and non-consensual sex in college ethics courses. The paper outlines a general teaching technique designed to elicit what students already think about a particular issue and then applies this general technique to the seven specific cases involving unwanted sex. Classroom results on these cases are described, reporting that students tend to adopt two different definitions of what it means for sex to be “consensual”. A commentary on these cases is (...) provided that can be used to encourage students to think through the cases critically, and the author provides a brief commentary on how these cases relate to the notion of autonomy. (shrink)

While there are many significant ethical questions which can deliver the lessons of an introductory ethics course (e.g. global warming, world hunger, genetic engineering), students do not face these moral difficulties directly in their lives. The author argues that commonly-faced ethical questions are more effective for rendering the content of introductory ethics immediately relevant to students. This paper presents a general outline of an introductory ethics course structured around the theme of drunk driving. Not only is drunk driving something that (...) college students are confronted with consistently, but the topic lends itself to discussions of moral subjectivism and moral skepticism, various moral theories’ framings of the problem, the assignment of culpability and conditions which mitigate it, secondary responsibility, intoxication and agency, punishment, deterrents, contrition, and forgiveness. The author details each of these discussions and concludes by considering further benefits of teaching a course built around this theme. (shrink)

Too often, ethics courses are taught in a way that Aristotle would reject, viz., they aim at the acquisition of theoretical moral knowledge as an end in itself. Aristotle instead argued that the ultimate goal in studying ethics should be to become good. This paper proposes a way to teach introductory ethics that takes Aristotle’s goal seriously. Such a course emphasizes the study of applied virtue ethics by exploring the nature of many of the most dangerous vices (e.g., envy, greed, (...) and lust) and detailing various concepts involved in, and ways individuals respond to, their own moral shortcomings, e.g., making excuses, repenting, the nature of temptation and forgiveness. Such a course, it is argued, can both convey many important points in ethical theory and moral reasoning as well as bridge the gap between abstract knowledge of an ethical theory and ethical choices that students face in their daily lives. (shrink)